

## “调戏”反遭“反调戏”——记 Visual Toolbar 的破解过程

cntrump

由于要做工具栏，在网上找到了 Visual Toolbar 这个工具，看了介绍挺不错的，下载回来之后发现软件要注册，但是这是个 04 年的软件，已经没法向作者购买了，更重要的原因是俺还在失业中，吃饭都成问题了，哪里还有钱注册呀~~

用 PEID 检测是 UPX 的老壳，直接手脱，过程不是重点反正能脱壳就行了。试着注册了一下，发现我最喜爱的 MessageBox 注册错误提示，太好了，下断 bp MessageBoxA，中断下来后往上找，很容易找到一些敏感信息：

```
00407790  6A FF          push -0x1
00407792  68 60A64900   push unpacked.0049A660
00407797  64:A1 00000000  mov eax,dword ptr fs:[0]
0040779D  50            push eax
0040779E  64:8925 00000000>mov dword ptr fs:[0],esp
004077A5  83EC 10       sub esp,0x10 ; 程序用的是 MFC 所以取值部分比较啰嗦
004077A8  53            push ebx ;关键的代码我都用红色标出来了。
004077A9  55            push ebp
004077AA  56            push esi
004077AB  57            push edi
004077AC  8BF1         mov esi,ecx
004077AE  6A 01         push 0x1
004077B0  E8 6D1B0900  call <jmp.&mfc42.#CWnd::UpdateData_6334> ;获取输入的值
004077B5  8D4C24 14     lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x14]
004077B9  E8 40180900  call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::CString_540>
004077BE  8D4424 14     lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x14]
004077C2  33DB         xor ebx,ebx
004077C4  50            push eax
004077C5  8D8E 4C0E0000  lea ecx,dword ptr ds:[esi+0xE4C]
004077CB  895C24 2C     mov dword ptr ss:[esp+0x2C],ebx
004077CF  E8 AA190900  call <jmp.&mfc42.#CWnd::GetWindowTextA_3874>
004077D4  51            push ecx
004077D5  8DBE 900E0000  lea edi,dword ptr ds:[esi+0xE90]
004077DB  8BCC         mov ecx,esp
004077DD  896424 20     mov dword ptr ss:[esp+0x20],esp
004077E1  57            push edi
004077E2  E8 05180900  call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::CString_535>
004077E7  51            push ecx
004077E8  8D5424 1C     lea edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x1C]
004077EC  8BCC         mov ecx,esp
004077EE  896424 20     mov dword ptr ss:[esp+0x20],esp
004077F2  52            push edx
004077F3  C64424 34 01  mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x34],0x1
004077F8  E8 EF170900  call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::CString_535>
004077FD  8D4424 18     lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x18]
00407801  885C24 30     mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x30],bl;以上部分是取机器码等信息
```

```

00407805 50 push eax
00407806 E8 65A3FFFF call unpacked.00401B70 ; 注册验证部分
0040780B 83C4 0C add esp,0xC
0040780E 8B0F mov ecx,dword ptr ds:[edi]
00407810 C64424 28 02 mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x28],0x2
00407815 8B41 F8 mov eax,dword ptr ds:[ecx-0x8]
00407818 83F8 04 cmp eax,0x4
0040781B 7F 35 jg short unpacked.00407852 ;用户名至少 5 位
0040781D 8D4C24 18 lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x18]
00407821 E8 D8170900 call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::CString_540>
00407826 6A 68 push 0x68
00407828 8D4C24 1C lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x1C]
0040782C C64424 2C 03 mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x2C],0x3
00407831 E8 84190900 call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::LoadStringA_4160>
00407836 8B5424 18 mov edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x18]
0040783A 53 push ebx
0040783B 53 push ebx
0040783C 52 push edx
0040783D 8BCE mov ecx,esi
0040783F E8 D81A0900 call <jmp.&mfc42.#CWnd::MessageBoxA_4224>
00407844 C64424 28 02 mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x28],0x2
00407849 8D4C24 18 lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x18]
0040784D E9 CB000000 jmp unpacked.0040791D
00407852 8B4C24 10 mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x10]
00407856 8B86 940E0000 mov eax,dword ptr ds:[esi+0xE94]
0040785C 51 push ecx
0040785D 50 push eax
0040785E FF15 30495200 call dword ptr
ds:[<&msvcrt._mbscmp>] ; MSVCRT._mbscmp ; 真假注册码比较
00407864 83C4 08 add esp,0x8
00407867 85C0 test eax,eax
00407869 75 78 jnz short unpacked.004078E3 ;关键跳, 跳就失败。
0040786B 891D F0164D00 mov dword ptr ds:[0x4D16F0],ebx
00407871 E8 A01A0900 call <jmp.&mfc42.#AfxGetModuleState_1168>
00407876 8B3F mov edi,dword ptr ds:[edi]
00407878 8B68 04 mov ebp,dword ptr ds:[eax+0x4]
0040787B 57 push edi
0040787C 68 D4534C00 push
unpacked.004C53D4 ; USER
00407881 68 C4534C00 push
unpacked.004C53C4 ; VisualToolbar10
00407886 8BCD mov ecx,ebp
00407888 E8 831A0900 call <jmp.&mfc42.#CWinApp::WriteProfileStringA_6403>
0040788D 8B5424 10 mov edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x10]

```

```

00407891    8BCD          mov ecx,ebp
00407893    52            push edx
00407894    68 C0534C00   push
unpacked.004C53C0                                ; SN
00407899    68 C4534C00   push
unpacked.004C53C4                                ; VisualToolbar10
0040789E    E8 6D1A0900   call <jmp.&mfc42.#CWinApp::WriteProfileStringA_6403>

```

从上面的代码分析可以知道，程序取得输入的注册码，用户名和机器码之后，就会进入一个 call 里面进行运行，得出来的结果再直接和输入的注册码相比较，如果一样，就提示注册成功，否则失败。跟进这个关键 call，看它都干了些什么。

关键 call 代码：

```

00401B70    6A FF          push -0x1
00401B72    68 3F9F4900   push unpacked.00499F3F
00401B77    64:A1 00000000 mov eax,dword ptr fs:[0]
00401B7D    50            push eax
00401B7E    64:8925 00000000>mov dword ptr fs:[0],esp
00401B85    83EC 20        sub esp,0x20
00401B88    53            push ebx
00401B89    55            push ebp
00401B8A    56            push esi
00401B8B    33F6          xor esi,esi
00401B8D    57            push edi
00401B8E    897424 1C      mov dword ptr ss:[esp+0x1C],esi
00401B92    8D4C24 20      lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x20]
00401B96    C74424 38 02000>mov dword ptr ss:[esp+0x38],0x2
00401B9E    E8 5B740900   call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::CString_540>
00401BA3    8B4424 48      mov eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x48]
00401BA7    C64424 38 03   mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x38],0x3
00401BAC    C64424 24 56   mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x24],0x56
00401BB1    C64424 25 69   mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x25],0x69
00401BB6    8B68 F8        mov ebp,dword ptr ds:[eax-0x8]
00401BB9    C64424 26 73   mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x26],0x73
00401BBE    83FD 0A        cmp ebp,0xA           ; 用户名位数和 10 比较
00401BC1    C64424 27 75   mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x27],0x75
00401BC6    C64424 28 61   mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x28],0x61
00401BCB    C64424 29 6C   mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x29],0x6C
00401BD0    C64424 2A 54   mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x2A],0x54
00401BD5    C64424 2B 42   mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x2B],0x42
00401BDA    C64424 2C 31   mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x2C],0x31
00401BDF    C64424 2D 30   mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x2D],0x30
00401BE4    7C 05          jl short unpacked.00401BEB ; 如果大于 10 位 ,那么就分配
10 字节的空间。
00401BE6    BD 0A000000   mov ebp,0xA

```

00401BEB	55	push ebp ; 否则根据用户名位数分配内存。
00401BEC	E8 1F740900	call <jmp.&mfc42.#operator new_823>
00401BF1	83C4 04	add esp,0x4
00401BF4	8D4C24 14	lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x14]
00401BF8	8BF8	mov edi,eax
00401BFA	E8 FF730900	call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::CString_540>
00401BFF	68 30164D00	push unpacked.004D1630
00401C04	8D4C24 14	lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x14]
00401C08	C64424 3C 04	mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x3C],0x4
00401C0D	E8 F8730900	call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::CString_537>
00401C12	3BEE	cmp ebp,esi
00401C14	C64424 38 05	mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x38],0x5
00401C19	7E 53	jle short unpacked.00401C6E
00401C1B	8D4424 24	lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x24]
00401C1F	2BC7	sub eax,edi
00401C21	894424 18	mov dword ptr ss:[esp+0x18],eax
00401C25	EB 04	jmp short unpacked.00401C2B
00401C27	8B4424 18	mov eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x18]
00401C2B	8B4C24 48	mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x48] ; esp+0x48 是用户名
00401C2F	8A140E	mov dl,byte ptr ds:[esi+ecx] ; 逐位取用户名,存入 dl
00401C32	8B4C24 44	mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x44] ; esp+0x44 是机器码
00401C36	8A1C0E	mov bl,byte ptr ds:[esi+ecx]; 逐位取机器码,存入 bl
00401C39	8D0C3E	lea ecx,dword ptr ds:[esi+edi]
00401C3C	8A0408	mov al,byte ptr ds:[eax+ecx] ; al 指向隐藏的字符串
"VisualTB10"		
00401C3F	32C3	xor al,bl
00401C41	32C2	xor al,dl
00401C43	0FBED0	movsx edx,al ; 用户名与机器码逐位异或,结果保存到 edx
中。		
00401C46	8801	mov byte ptr ds:[ecx],al
00401C48	52	push edx
00401C49	8D4424 18	lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x18]
00401C4D	68 34504C00	push unpacked.004C5034 ; %d
00401C52	50	push eax
00401C53	E8 A0730900	call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::Format_2818> ; 得到的值转化为
字符串形式。		
00401C58	83C4 0C	add esp,0xC
00401C5B	8D4C24 14	lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x14]
00401C5F	51	push ecx
00401C60	8D4C24 14	lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x14]
00401C64	E8 9B730900	call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::operator+=_939> ; 把字符串连
接起来。		
00401C69	46	inc esi
00401C6A	3BF5	cmp esi,ebp ; 循环次数是用户名的位数

```

00401C6C ^ 7C B9      jl short unpacked.00401C27
00401C6E 57          push edi
00401C6F E8 6C730900 call <jmp.&mfc42.#operator delete_825>
00401C74 8B7424 44   mov esi,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x44]
00401C78 83C4 04     add esp,0x4
00401C7B 8D5424 10   lea edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x10]
00401C7F 8BCE       mov ecx,esi
00401C81 52          push edx
00401C82 E8 65730900 call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::CString_535>
00401C87 BB 01000000 mov ebx,0x1
00401C8C 895C24 1C   mov dword ptr ss:[esp+0x1C],ebx
00401C90 8D4C24 10   lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x10]
00401C94 C64424 38 04 mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x38],0x4
00401C99 E8 48730900 call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::~CString_800>
00401C9E 8D4C24 14   lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x14]
00401CA2 C64424 38 03 mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x38],0x3
00401CA7 E8 3A730900 call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::~CString_800>
00401CAC 8D4C24 20   lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x20]
00401CB0 C64424 38 02 mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x38],0x2
00401CB5 E8 2C730900 call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::~CString_800>
00401CBA 8D4C24 44   lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x44]
00401CBE 885C24 38   mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x38],bl
00401CC2 E8 1F730900 call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::~CString_800>
00401CC7 8D4C24 48   lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x48]
00401CCB C64424 38 00 mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x38],0x0
00401CD0 E8 11730900 call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::~CString_800>
00401CD5 8B4C24 30   mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x30]
00401CD9 8BC6       mov eax,esi
00401CDB 5F          pop edi
00401CDC 5E          pop esi
00401CDD 5D          pop ebp
00401CDE 5B          pop ebx
00401CDF 64:890D 00000000>mov dword ptr fs:[0],ecx
00401CE6 83C4 2C     add esp,0x2C
00401CE9 C3          retn

```

注册过程很简单，就是机器码逐位异或用户名，用户名如果长度大于 10，那么只取前 10 位进行计算。对应的 WTL 实现代码如下：

```
DoDataExchange(DDX_SAVE); //从控件中取值
```

```
TCHAR szFlag[] = _T("VisualTB10");
```

```
TCHAR *p = szFlag;
```

```
m_strSN = _T(""); // m_strSN 保存生成的注册码
```

```
CString csTemp;
```



```

0041BC8B  51          push ecx
0041BC8C  8BCE       mov ecx,esi
0041BC8E  C78424 CC480000>mov dword ptr ss:[esp+0x48CC],0x0
0041BC99  E8 1EDC0700 call <jmp.&mfc42.#CWinApp::GetProfileStringA_3522>
0041BC9E  68 DC5A4C00 push
unpacked.004C5ADC                                ; Password
0041BCA3  68 C0534C00 push
unpacked.004C53C0                                ; SN
0041BCA8  8D5424 20   lea edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x20]
0041BCAC  68 C4534C00 push
unpacked.004C53C4                                ; VisualToolbar10
0041BCB1  52          push edx
0041BCB2  8BCE       mov ecx,esi
0041BCB4  889C24 CC480000 mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x48CC],bl
0041BCBB  E8 FCDB0700 call <jmp.&mfc42.#CWinApp::GetProfileStringA_3522>
0041BCC0  51          push ecx
0041BCC1  8D4424 10   lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x10]
0041BCC5  8BCC       mov ecx,esp
0041BCC7  896424 20   mov dword ptr ss:[esp+0x20],esp
0041BCCB  50          push eax
0041BCCC  C68424 C4480000>mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x48C4],0x2
0041BCD4  E8 13D30700 call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::CString_535>
0041BCD9  51          push ecx
0041BCDA  8D5424 10   lea edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x10]
0041BCDE  8BCC       mov ecx,esp
0041BCE0  896424 1C   mov dword ptr ss:[esp+0x1C],esp
0041BCE4  52          push edx
0041BCE5  C68424 C8480000>mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x48C8],0x3
0041BCED  E8 FAD20700 call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::CString_535>
0041BCF2  8D4424 18   lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x18]
0041BCF6  C68424 C4480000>mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x48C4],0x2
0041BCFE  50          push eax
0041BCFF  E8 6C5EFEFF call unpacked.00401B70 ;注册验证的部份 ,在前面已经分析过了。
0041BD04  8B4C24 24   mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x24]
0041BD08  8B5424 1C   mov edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x1C]
0041BD0C  51          push ecx
0041BD0D  52          push edx
0041BD0E  C68424 D0480000>mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x48D0],0x4
0041BD16  FF15 30495200 call dword ptr ds:[<&msvcrt._mbscmp>] ;
MSVCRT._mbscmp ; 真假码比较部分。
0041BD1C  83C4 14    add esp,0x14
0041BD1F  85C0       test eax,eax
0041BD21  75 07     jnz short unpacked.0041BD2A; 关键跳

```

在注册成功的时候，程序已经把注册信息保存到注册表中了，程序会在初始化的时候对注册信息进行验证。最可疑的地方是 0041BC70 处的 call 跟进行看它做了什么：

```
00401A60  6A FF          push -0x1
00401A62  68 EF9E4900    push unpacked.00499EEF
00401A67  64:A1 00000000  mov eax,dword ptr fs:[0]
00401A6D  50             push eax
00401A6E  64:8925 00000000>mov dword ptr fs:[0],esp
00401A75  83EC 10        sub esp,0x10
00401A78  56             push esi
00401A79  57             push edi
00401A7A  C74424 14 000000>mov dword ptr ss:[esp+0x14],0x0
00401A82  E8 A9FFFFFF    call unpacked.00401A30 ; 取 C 盘序列号并简单处理
00401A87  8BF8          mov edi,eax
00401A89  B8 8F588B4F    mov eax,0x4F8B588F ; 64 位乘法,结果保存形式为
EDX:EAX
00401A8E  F7E7          mul edi ; edi 的值不变
00401A90  8BF7          mov esi,edi
00401A92  8D4C24 0C     lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0xC]
00401A96  2BF2          sub esi,edx ; edx 是高 32 位
00401A98  D1EE          shr esi,1
00401A9A  03F2          add esi,edx
00401A9C  C1EE 10       shr esi,0x10
00401A9F  E8 5A750900    call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::CString_540>
00401AA4  56             push esi
00401AA5  8D4424 10     lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x10]
00401AA9  68 34504C00    push unpacked.004C5034 ; %d
00401AAE  50             push eax
00401AAF  C74424 2C 010000>mov dword ptr ss:[esp+0x2C],0x1
00401AB7  E8 3C750900    call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::Format_2818> ; 格式化为字符串。
00401ABC  8D04B6        lea eax,dword ptr ds:[esi+esi*4] ; 等价于 eax=esi*5
00401ABF  83C4 0C       add esp,0xC
00401AC2  8D0480        lea eax,dword ptr ds:[eax+eax*4] ; eax=eax*5
00401AC5  8D0480        lea eax,dword ptr ds:[eax+eax*4] ; eax=eax*5
00401AC8  8D0480        lea eax,dword ptr ds:[eax+eax*4] ; eax=eax*5
00401ACB  8D0C80        lea ecx,dword ptr ds:[eax+eax*4] ; ecx=eax*5
00401ACE  C1E1 05       shl ecx,0x5
00401AD1  2BF9          sub edi,ecx ; edi 的值还是上面的。
00401AD3  8D4C24 08     lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x8]
00401AD7  E8 22750900    call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::CString_540>
00401ADC  57             push edi
00401ADD  8D5424 0C     lea edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0xC]
00401AE1  68 34504C00    push unpacked.004C5034 ; %d
```



```

00401AE6    52                push edx
00401AE7    C64424 2C 02     mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x2C],0x2
00401AEC    E8 07750900     call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::Format_2818> ; 格式化字符串
00401AF1    83C4 0C          add esp,0xC
00401AF4    8D4424 08        lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x8]
00401AF8    8D4C24 0C        lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0xC]
00401AFC    8D5424 10        lea edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x10]
00401B00    50                push eax
00401B01    51                push ecx
00401B02    52                push edx
00401B03    E8 EA740900     call <jmp.&mfc42.#operator+_922> ; 把上面的两个字符串
连接起来,得到机器码
00401B08    8B7424 28        mov esi,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x28]
00401B0C    8D4424 10        lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x10]
00401B10    50                push eax
00401B11    8BCE            mov ecx,esi
00401B13    C64424 24 03     mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x24],0x3
00401B18    E8 CF740900     call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::CString_535>
00401B1D    C74424 14 01000>mov dword ptr ss:[esp+0x14],0x1
00401B25    8D4C24 10        lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x10]
00401B29    C64424 20 02     mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x20],0x2
00401B2E    E8 B3740900     call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::-CString_800>
00401B33    8D4C24 08        lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x8]
00401B37    C64424 20 01     mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x20],0x1
00401B3C    E8 A5740900     call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::-CString_800>
00401B41    8D4C24 0C        lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0xC]
00401B45    C64424 20 00     mov byte ptr ss:[esp+0x20],0x0
00401B4A    E8 97740900     call <jmp.&mfc42.#CString::-CString_800>
00401B4F    8B4C24 18        mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+0x18]
00401B53    8BC6            mov eax,esi
00401B55    5F                pop edi
00401B56    5E                pop esi
00401B57    64:890D 0000000>mov dword ptr fs:[0],ecx
00401B5E    83C4 1C          add esp,0x1C
00401B61    C3                retn

```

从上面的分析可以知道，这个 call 的作用就是生成一个机器码。相应的 WTL 代码如下：

```

CString csM1, csM2;

DWORD dwVSN, dwEDI;
GetVolumeInformation(_T("C:\\"), NULL, 0xC, &dwVSN, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0xA);

dwEDI = dwVSN ^= 0x18915791; //edi

```

```
DWORD64 dw64Number = (DWORD64)dwVSN * 0x4f8b588f;  
DWORD dwTemp = HIDWORD(dw64Number);
```

```
dwVSN -= dwTemp;  
dwVSN >>= 1;  
dwVSN += dwTemp;  
dwVSN >>= 0x10;
```

```
csM1.Format(_T("%d"), dwVSN);
```

```
DWORD dwTemp2 = dwVSN * 5;  
dwTemp2 *= 5;  
dwTemp2 *= 5;  
dwTemp2 *= 5;
```

```
DWORD dwTemp3 = dwTemp2 * 5;  
dwTemp3 <<= 5;  
dwEDI -= dwTemp3;
```

```
csM2.Format(_T("%d"), dwEDI);
```

```
m_strMCode = csM1 + csM2; //生成的机器码
```

```
DoDataExchange(DDX_LOAD);
```

既然注册验证部分都是一样的,为什么验证不了呢,程序明明已经提示注册成功了呀?看了猫腻就在这个机器码身上,编译运行看一下[验证用的机器码](#)和在[注册界面里显示的机器码](#)有什么不一样:

[验证用的机器码: 67206293](#)

[注册界面里显示的机器码: 672006293](#)

看到差别了么?可恶呀,在中间插了一个0。

现在明白了,程序的注册验证流程是这样的,用户输入用户名,和序列号。如果注册成功,就提示要重启程序进行验证,然后程序在重启验证过程中,用来参与验证的机器码和在注册界面时显示的机器码不一样,所以即使猜解了注册算法,做出了注册机,只能是让程序提示注册成功信息而已,还要找出程序生成机器码的部份,用真正的机器码来生成注册码才能真正让程序注册。

作者应该是根据用户邮寄回来的机器码和用户名来计算真正的注册码返还给用户,用户在注册的时候,除了输入用户名和注册码,还要输入机器码,这也是为什么机器码那一栏是可以输入的原因了。

举个例子,假如我要向作者购买该软件授权,那么我需要把机器码,用户名发给作者:

机器码: 672006293 (在注册界面显示的)

用户名: cntrump (这是我要注册的用户名)

作者会回复下列信息:

机器码：67206293 (用上面的机器码计算得到，根据对比发现只是简单的去掉中间的 0)

用户名：cntrump

序列号：3485355345129

我需要把这三项都填上才能成功注册。

要做出和作者一样的注册机，还需要把 **用户机器码 -> 注册机器码** 这部分分析出来，根据上面的分析已经知道了注册机器码的生成过程，通过和在注册界面上显示的机器码对比可以发现，用户机器码去掉中间的 0 就等于注册机器码了。相应的 WTL 代码如下：

```
CString GetRealMachineID(CString csUserMachineID)
{
    int nLen = csUserMachineID.GetLength();
    CString csM1 = csUserMachineID.Left(nLen/2); // 取前半部分
    CString csM2 = csUserMachineID.Right(nLen/2); // 取后半部分

    return csM1+csM2; //前后两部分结合就是注册机器码
}
```

有了这些信息，就能写出和作者一模一样的注册机了，核心代码如下 (WTL)：

```
DoDataExchange(DDX_SAVE);
```

//和上面生成注册码不同的地方就是多了下面这 2 句代码。

```
CString csTmpMCode = m_strMCode; //用中间变量保存用户机器码
m_strMCode = GetRealMachineID(csTmpMCode); //计算得到注册机器码
```

```
TCHAR szFlag[] = _T("VisualTB10");
```

```
TCHAR *p = szFlag;
```

```
m_strSN = _T("");
```

```
CString csTemp;
```

```
if (m_strMCode.IsEmpty() ||
    m_strUserName.IsEmpty() ||
    (m_strUserName.GetLength() < 5))
    return 0;
```

```
int nLen = m_strUserName.GetLength();
```

```
TCHAR *pstrNameBuffer = new TCHAR[nLen<10?nLen+1:10];
```

```
TCHAR *pstrMCodeBuffer = new TCHAR[m_strMCode.GetLength()+1];
```

```
Istrcpy(pstrNameBuffer, m_strUserName.GetBuffer(m_strUserName.GetLength()));
```

```
Istrcpy(pstrMCodeBuffer, m_strMCode.GetBuffer(m_strMCode.GetLength()));
```

```
for (int i = 0; i < (nLen<10?nLen:10); i++)
```

```
{
    csTemp.Format(_T("%d"), p[i] ^ pstrMCodeBuffer[i] ^ pstrNameBuffer[i]);
    m_strSN += csTemp;
```

```
}
```

```
DoDataExchange(DDX_LOAD); //把最终结果显示到界面。
```

顺便说一下，代码虽然使用 WTL，但是也能换成 MFC 的代码，只需要把 DoDataExchange 换成 UpdateData，DDX\_LOAD 换成 FALSE,DDX\_SAVE 换成 TRUE，就可以了。